I was impressed today by the NYT’s on-line lead story “Incoming Democrats Put Populism Before Ideology”. It impressed me for two reasons. One, I am currently attending the Film & History league Conference in Dallas, Texas where I delivered a paper on Michael Moore’s populism, politics, and paranoia. Nearly every one of the panels I have attended here on recent documentaries has touched on the wave of populist rhetoric, politics, affect that have been sweeping the U.S. Two, I am reading Ernesto Laclau’s latest On Populist Reason, which extends his critique of populism begun in such books as Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, and with Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
I am only a couple chapters into Laclau’s book, but what he seems to be getting at is that populism is more a desire than anything else, but it is also all those other things I mention above–rhetoric, politics, affect. What does this mean? Well, any political movement can basically be described as populist. In a basic sense, because every political movement involves a people. Beyond this, every political movement also assumes certain political desires on the part of its people, psychological or affective positions which, strictly speaking, fall outside of the realm of traditional political discourse a la Aristotle, the founding fathers, and perhaps even Marx and his descendants.
So when the Times says that Dems are putting populism ahead of ideology the statement only makes rhetorical sense in the realm of language and argument, no real sense in the world of politics and things. I realize this is all very complicated. I’m still working out the details myself. Perhaps a real-world example will help . . .
The last time there was a shift in control of congressional politics was 1994 when the Gingrich Republicans took over. The Gingrinch program may be accurately described as an “ideologization” of the Right, and a possible re-ideologization of American politics generally. (These ideas come from Dana Nelson and Tyler Curtain’s dialogue in the collection Our Monica, Ourselves.) What does this mean? Well, before Gingrich, since the late 1800s the Republican party was purely a party of privilege, that is, corporatist, statist, and pro-business. It had no real ideological platform except for the Zen-like “Going with the flow of the market.” Gingrich brought ideology into the mix by instead building a platform for the Republicans. This involved adopteing the politics of hate paired with financial austerity and an abandonment of social programs, i.e.it was pro-white, anti-gay, anti-female, anti-welfare, pro-business, pro-war, isolationist, nationalist, etc. Despite the program’s utter irrationality on paper, and American politics’s reputed rationality, the program appealed to our desire for two reasons, 1) because of its heated, hateful elements, 2) because it constituted a set of beliefs, i.e. a platform, which could be taken or left, not simply an affective stance like Clinton sought. If Clinton had had a program, it would have been a direct descendant from New Deal and Great Society social welfare programs, popular programs unbeneficial to the rich.
The populist dems, as the Times describes them, are comparably politically weak when compared with both the Clinton dems and the Gingrich Republicans since they lack both a political platform (“We’re better than the other guys”), and because they run a greater risk of alienating the public on an emotional or affective level. Why this latter? Well, because the dems are unlikely to end the Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and on Terror without massive losses in blood and treasure either to the U.S., its allies, or the occupied nations, or a large-scale spread in terrorist activity (NB: This wouldn’t have happened if the wars hadn’t been started in the first place. A paradox that only seems like a paradox.). Universal healthcare reform seems more possible now, but it still a distant goal and will probably result in class warfare before reform. The dems have no response to the problems of the disenfranchised or the poor.
And this last is what really stood out for me in the Times article. Since all these dems got elected not because they are authentic, clever, or driven, but merely not the other guy, they are unlike the other guy in all categories but one, their relative wealth and privilege in comparison to the rest of the United States population. These are not political leaders in the traditional sense, i.e. charismatic, auratic figures, but rich men and women–doctors and lawyers, pseudo-celebrities, former sports players, businesspeople, captains of industry, etc. Is this the real face of democracy? Perhaps. But I also wonder whether or not it is also the face of a nation starving, unsated by the blood of its imperial adventures abroad.